- The High Court in Cape Town has dismissed the Legal Practice Council's urgent application to suspend attorneys Adele Van Wyk and Andaleen Chimes.
- The court found that the regulator did not carry out a proper investigation or give the attorneys a chance to respond before approaching the court.
- The judgment emphasises that Section 43 of the Legal Practice Act is an exceptional remedy and cannot be used to bypass procedural fairness.
The High Court in Cape Town has dismissed an urgent application by the Legal Practice Council (LPC) to suspend attorneys Adele Van Wyk and Andaleen Chimes. The court ruled that the LPC failed to carry out the fair and meaningful investigation required by law before seeking their removal from practice.
Acting Judge NT Mayosi, with Judge T Ndita concurring, found that the LPC used the extraordinary powers of Section 43 of the Legal Practice Act without properly investigating the complaint, giving the attorneys a chance to answer the allegations, or establishing a lawful basis for urgent intervention. The court dismissed the application with costs, including the costs of two counsel where applicable.
Allegations linked to divorce dispute
The LPC alleged there was prima facie evidence that Van Wyk and Chimes had misappropriated R16 954 528.45 entrusted to them by a client, claiming the amount increased to R23 257 036.27 after lost interest was added.
The complaint alleged that trust money had been diverted through property transactions into dormant trusts and companies, that signatures had been falsified, fictitious transactions created and some of the money used for Van Wyk's personal benefit, including cryptocurrency purchases. The regulator relied on 13 transactions dating back to 2011 to support its application.
The complaint was lodged in September 2025 by Constantyn Van Wyk, the first respondent's estranged husband, while the couple were involved in highly contested divorce proceedings. The LPC said it had considered whether the complaint had been lodged to gain a tactical advantage in the divorce but concluded that it had merit.
Attorneys were not given a chance to respond
The court found that neither attorney had been informed of the complaint before the LPC launched urgent proceedings seeking their suspension.
Chimes told the court she became aware of the allegations only after being served with the application. According to her evidence, the LPC never contacted her, requested documents, sought an explanation or provided a copy of the complaint before asking the court to suspend her from practice. The judgment records that Van Wyk was in the same position.
Judge Mayosi held that this failure struck at the heart of the statutory disciplinary process. "The respondents were not furnished with the complaint before the institution of these proceedings. No proper investigation, in the sense contemplated by Section 37(3), was conducted. No opportunity was afforded to the respondents to respond to the complaint before the decision was taken to invoke Section 43."
He added that the regulator had relied solely on one side of the dispute. "The LPC's decision to institute these proceedings was taken solely on the strength of the allegations in the complaint, without first obtaining the respondents' version or verifying the factual foundation upon which the drastic remedy it seeks is premised."
Court rejects shortcut to urgent suspension
Judge Mayosi said Section 43 of the Legal Practice Act is intended as an extraordinary protective measure and cannot replace the ordinary disciplinary process.
He said an investigating committee is required to conduct a meaningful investigation by interrogating allegations, gathering information and considering the practitioner's explanation before recommending urgent court proceedings. "The section is triggered only upon the existence of a verified, fully interrogated factual foundation," the judge said.
Quoting earlier authority, the judgment said an investigation "is not an event limited to a discussion conducted by the Investigation Committee but a process which also includes a meaningful interrogation of the allegations against the practitioner".
Judge Mayosi concluded that the LPC had effectively attempted to use section 43 to begin an investigation rather than rely on one that had already been completed. "The mere lodging of a complaint does not constitute reliable evidence of misconduct," he said.
Respondents disputed the allegations
Van Wyk denied the allegations and argued they had to be viewed within the context of the parties' long-standing marital and commercial relationship.
She said many of the transactions formed part of joint business, property and investment arrangements undertaken with her husband's knowledge and authority, and that the allegations mirrored claims already being contested in the pending divorce proceedings.
The respondents also argued that the disputed transactions stretched back more than a decade, involved complex financial arrangements across numerous entities and trusts, and raised factual disputes that could not properly be resolved on affidavit.
They further pointed out that Van Wyk had already submitted a detailed written response addressing each of the 13 transactions before the urgent application was launched, but the LPC failed to place that response before the court.
Court found no basis for urgency
The court questioned why the LPC relied on urgent proceedings when several of the disputed transactions dated back to 2011.
Judge Mayosi noted that the regulator failed to explain the lengthy delay in lodging the complaint or why no immediate protective intervention was necessary. He found there was "no demonstrated present risk to the public or to trust creditors requiring the urgent protective intervention" contemplated by section 43.
The court also observed that, despite the LPC recommending disciplinary proceedings months earlier, there was no indication that any disciplinary hearing had commenced by the time the application was argued.
No complaint was lodged against chimes
Judge Mayosi also found there was no complaint against Chimes when the disciplinary process began. Instead, the LPC sought to implicate her because she was a co-director of the firm, arguing she must have known about or benefited from the alleged misconduct.
The court held there was no factual foundation supporting that conclusion and no proper jurisdictional basis for invoking Section 43 against her.
Failure to join all parties was fatal
Another independent reason for dismissing the application was the LPC's failure to join the firm's third director, Lauren Marthinus.
The court found the relief sought would effectively freeze the firm's trust accounts, place them under the control of a curator, remove client files and paralyse the practice. Those orders would directly affect Marthinus' legal rights and responsibilities as a director, yet she had not been cited or allowed to be heard. Judge Mayosi held that the non-joinder was fatal to the application.
Court dismisses application
Judge Mayosi concluded that the LPC had failed to establish a lawful basis for invoking the extraordinary powers contained in section 43 of the Legal Practice Act.
The court found the regulator had not conducted the meaningful investigation required by law, denied the respondents procedural fairness, failed to establish urgency, improperly sought relief against Chimes despite there being no complaint against her and failed to join a necessary party.
The application was accordingly dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel where employed on Scale C.
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