- Eugene Etsebeth accused Viola Otto of telling a third party that he and his brother had stolen a buffalo, diesel and cattle medication.
- The Limpopo High Court found that the magistrate made a mistake by treating confirmatory affidavits as hearsay evidence.
- The judges still refused to grant a final protection order but set aside the costs order against Etsebeth.
Allegations involving a stolen buffalo, diesel and cattle medication became the focus of a harassment protection order dispute that reached the High Court in Polokwane.
Although the judges found that the magistrate had incorrectly assessed the supporting evidence, they decided that the alleged conduct did not justify granting a final protection order.
Supporting affidavits were not hearsay
The appeal was heard by a full bench of the High Court in Polokwane, comprising Judges JT Ngobeni and MF Kganyago. In a judgment delivered on 17 November 2026, Judge Ngobeni found that the magistrate had made a mistake when assessing the evidence, but agreed that dismissing the protection order application was ultimately correct.
The dispute began with an application by Eugene Etsebeth against Viola Otto in the Magistrates’ Court in Thabazimbi, under the Protection from Harassment Act. Etsebeth said Otto had contacted Ludi Mouton and told him that Etsebeth and his brother, Elwin, had stolen a buffalo and diesel from Elwin’s former employer. She also allegedly claimed that Elwin had bought cattle medication in his employer’s name and given it to Etsebeth.
Mouton then shared the allegations with Riaan Moolman, the owner of Mamba Engineering, who had worked with Etsebeth for several years. Moolman contacted Etsebeth about what he had heard. Etsebeth insisted that the allegations were false and claimed they threatened his reputation, employment prospects, and both current and future business relationships.
He obtained an interim protection order on 25 November 2024, along with a warrant of arrest. When the matter returned to court, Otto opposed the application and denied the allegations. Magistrate HD Swart dismissed the interim protection order on 12 August 2025, finding that Etsebeth’s case relied on second-hand information and that the affidavits from Mouton, Moolman, and Elwin were not enough without direct testimony and cross-examination.
On appeal, Etsebeth argued that the magistrate had used the wrong legal test and had wrongly treated the confirmatory affidavits as hearsay. Judge Ngobeni agreed that the magistrate was mistaken, explaining that hearsay evidence is evidence whose value depends on the credibility of someone other than the person presenting it.
However, Mouton’s affidavit addressed information that Otto had allegedly told him directly. Judge Ngobeni found that once Mouton confirmed the conversation in his affidavit, this could not simply be called hearsay just because he had not testified in person. The judgment also explained that in civil cases, section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act allows hearsay evidence to be admitted if the interests of justice require it.
Allegations did not justify protection order
Even though the magistrate had misjudged the evidence, Judge Ngobeni concluded that the facts did not justify a final protection order. The judge noted that the application centred on a reported phone call between Otto and Mouton. Otto did not deny contacting Mouton, but she disagreed with his account of what was said.
The judgment highlighted that Otto had promised to provide Mouton with more information if he called her later that day, but when he tried, she did not answer. There was no evidence that Otto contacted Etsebeth’s employer or kept spreading the allegations. Judge Ngobeni saw her failure to follow up as a sign that she had withdrawn from the situation rather than continued with the alleged conduct.
Referring to the Full Bench judgment in Roberts v Mabuza, the judge explained that harassment under the Act must cause real fear, alarm, or distress. A single incident can qualify, but only if it is so oppressive that its consequences match those of repeated conduct. He distinguished this case from Pringle v Mailula, where repeated threatening emails showed the kind of conduct the Act is meant to address.
Judge Ngobeni decided that the alleged conduct in Etsebeth’s case, even if it involved spreading damaging information, did not reach the level needed for a protection order.
Costs order set aside
The appeal also challenged the magistrate’s decision to order Etsebeth to pay the costs of the original application without giving reasons. Judge Ngobeni pointed to section 16 of the Protection from Harassment Act, which says that a costs order may only be made against a party if the court is satisfied that the party acted frivolously, vexatiously or unreasonably.
The judge found that Etsebeth’s application did not fall into any of these categories and that the costs order was not justified. The appeal succeeded only in relation to costs, with the dismissal of the interim protection order remaining, and the order as to costs replaced with no order as to costs. There was also no costs order for the appeal.
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